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STATUS OF THE PROCEEDS OF LIFE INSURANCE
UNDER THE COMMUNITY PROPERTY SYSTEM
The vast and increasing amount of money invested in policies
of life insurance in the states having a community property system makes the status of the proceeds of such policies under that
system of very general interest, and renders it highly desirable
and important that the laws as to such contracts should be worked
out with dispatch, definiteness and certainty The fact that there
are in the community property states different theories as to the
character and extent of the wife's interest and different statutes
affecting the determination of the rights of the spouses has led to
somewhat varying results. As the Supreme Court of Washington
has not yet declared itself, with reference to contracts of insurance, upon a number of the questions raised, a discussion of the
principles winch would seem to be applicable to their solution
should be timely
It is with considerable hesitation, however, that one ventures
to discuss questions not yet specifically passed upon in this State
and on winch so many members of the Bar have opimons and ideas
drawn from their own practice and experience. One can only proceed with proper humility and with care to avoid error and too
much of prophecy as to the future action of our Supreme Court.
A contract of life insurance is like any other contract in that
it is a valuable chose in action and property right.1 As such, its
character, whether community or separate, should be determined
by the time of its acquisition 2 or by the character of the considera1

Hutson v. Merrtfield, 51 Ind. 24, 19 A. R. 722 (1875) St. John v. Amer%canMutual Life Ins. Co., 13 N. Y. 31, 64 Am. Dec. 529 (1855))
Mutual
Life Ins. Go. v. Allen, 138 Blass. 24, 52 Am. Rep. 245 (1884) In re Brown's
Estate, 124 Wash. 273, 214 Pac. 10 (1923) Bundy v. Bundy, 149 Wash.
464, 271 Pac. 268 (1928).
'Rem. Comp. St. of Wash., Sec. 6890, 6891, 6892; In re Brown's Estate,
124 Wash. 273, 214 Pac. 10 (1923), and many cases cited therein; Neisz V.
Netsz, 152 Wash. 336, 277 Pac. 849 (1929)
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tion given for it. If there is no actual evidence of the character of
the consideration it will be determined presumptively by the marital status at the time the contract right is initiated.8 The problem
is complicated, however, because the contract of life insurance is
ordinarily of such a character that the consideration is not all paid
at the same time, but by installments. In one important respect
the life insurance contract does differ from many other contracts.
It is not a contract where a promise is exchanged for a promise. It
is a contract where, in consideration of one act (payment of the
first premium) and the performance of a similar act periodically,
the company promises to pay upon the happening of a specified
event or events. But there is no promise on the part of the insured to perform the periodic acts. He may neglect or decline
to make subsequent payments and he thereby incurs no liability 4
It .is not the case of the purchase of property for a consideration
partly cash and partly promissory In the latter case the whole
consideration is furnished at the very beginning. If, for instance,
the contract is made prior to marriage the consideration may be
said to be partly separate money and partly the separate promise
of the person making it, the property right has been acquired
without the use of any community asset. If community funds are
used later in payment of this separate obligation, the character of
the property acquired is not thereby changed. This principle
may be said to be fairly well settled.5 It ought to be applicable to
the ordinary contract for the purchase of real estate, but the law
in Washington in respect to such contracts has been warped by
the view which the Supreme Court has taken of the interest ac
quired by the vendee under such contracts where there is a provision for forfeitureA
The proper application of this principle of community property
to life insurance contracts depends upon the nature of such a
contract If it is to be regarded as a series of separate periodic
contracts, then obviously its character will change with the char3McKay on Community Property (2d ed.) Sec. 517 In re Brown's Estate, supra, Blankenshtp v. Knox, 105 Wash. 416, 178 Pac. 629 (1919).
I Cooley's Briefs on Insurance (2d Ed.) p. 116.
5Katterhagen v. Metster 75 Wash. 112, 134 Pac. 673 (1913). Here, as
elsewhere in this article, no attempt Is made to make the citation of cases
exhaustive.
In re Kuhn's Estate, 132 Wash. 678, 233 Pac. 293 (1925) Ashford v.
Reese, 132 Wash. 649, 233 Pac. 29 (1925)
AVlward v. LallV, 147 Wash.
29, 264 Pac. 983 (1928)
Tieton Hotel Co. v. Manhetm, 75 Wash. 641, 135
Pac. 658 (1913) Converse v. LaBarge, 92 Wash. 282, 158 Pac. 958 (1916).
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acter of each periodic payment, but if it be regarded as one continuous contract and the periodic payments be viewed as merely the
performance of conditions necessary to keep alive rights already
acquired and existing, then the character of the original consideration determines the status of the contract. Its character is not
changed by the succeeding payments. They at most would create
no more than a right to reimbursement. That the latter is the
correct view of the nature of ordinary modern life insurance contracts is well settled.7 The insurance company is bound on its
promise if the periodic acts are performed. It canont terminate
the contract by declining to receive the payment of a premium. On
the other hand, many of the valuable rights of the insured date
back to the date of his policy The size of the periodic payment,
for instance, depends upon Ins age at that time and not upon his
age at the time each succeeding payment is made.8
Applying this principle of community property logically then to
contracts of life insurance, so viewed, it follows that the character
of the property right which ultimately produces the proceeds of the
insurance is determined at the time the contract is taken out and
depends upon the character of the funds used. Ordinarily, a policy of life insurance is not in force until the first premium is paid
either in cash or by note. The signing of the application, therefore,
would not initiate the property right. But if the contract was completed before marriage by the payment of the first premium, and
we are assuming at present that we have a policy where the proceeds are payable to the insured's estate, those proceeds should be
separate property If subsequent premiums are paid out of community funds, the community estate should be entitled to reimbursements to the extent of the funds contributed, unless the facts
furnish a basis for the presumption that it was intended to make
7New York Life Ins. Co. v.'Statham, 93 U. S. 24, 23 L. ed 789 (1876).
8 A similar question arises in connection with the re-instatement of
a lapsed policy. Suppose a. policy taken out prior to marriage lapses,

and is re-instated after marriage by the payment of community funds. If
the contract when re-instated is a new contract, it is community property.
If it is merely the revival of an old contract, it would seem to be separate.

The weight of authority holds it is not a new contract, but the revival of
the old contract. New York Life Ins. Co. v. Fecht, 29 Fed. (2d) 318
(1928), Mutual Life Ins. Co. v. Dreeban, 20 Fed. (2d) 394 (1927) Wastun
v. Lzncoln Life Ins. Co., 12 Fed. (2d) 422 (1926) Resty v. John Hancock
Mutual Life Ins. Co., 245 Mass. 373, 139 N. E. 538 (1923) Lovzck v. Provident Life Ass'n., 110 No. Car. 93, 14 S. E. 506 (1892) Reed v. Missourz
Mutual Life, 5 S. W (2d) 675 (1928) New York Life Ins. Co. v. Rosen,
236 N. Y. Sup. (1929).
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a gift of those community funds to the separate estate of the spouse
concerned. Of course, if the policy is taken out after marriage
the presumption will be normally that community funds have been
used in its purchase. It is also quite possible to have a case where
a policy is contracted for after marriage and the first premium
paid partly with separate and partly with community funds. If
there were no other facts affecting the matter, the proceeds should
be apportioned proportionately to the respective estates. As a
practical matter, however, if it appeared that succeeding payments
were made largely or entirely with community funds, courts would
be very likely either to disregard the share of the separate estate
in the first payment, particularly if comparatively small, or from
very slight evidence to presume an intent to make a gift to the
community of so much of the separate funds. This result would
comport quite well in all probability with the real intent of the
insured.
If the contract was originally separate, however, and the insured
possessed separate funds or a separate income quite sufficient to
enable him to pay the later premiums, and there was no clear proof
that community funds were used in the payment of those premiums,
it would be presumed that the subsequent premiums came also from
the separate funds' This is perhaps only another way of saying
that the burden of proving a right to reimbursement rests upon the
estate claiming it.
The rule just laid down is the rule which has been established
in Louisiana by the decisions of its Supreme Court." It is not the
view, however, which was taken in an early case in California."
There a policy of endowment insurance was taken out by the husband before marriage. It appeared that one-third of the number
of premiums was paid from separate property and two-thirds from
community funds, and the court held that the proceeds belonged
to the respective estates in proportion to their contributions. That
decision has been often cited and has been given more weight than
it deserves. It has been severely criticized 2 and is wrong in prinMutual ife Ins. Co. v. Lundqutst, 140 Wash. 345, 248 Pac. 808 (1926).
It should be said here that the most thorough and helpful discussion of
the chief problem dealt with in this article is to be found in the excellent
briefs of counsel in the Lundquist case. See also Guye v. Guye, 63 Wash.
340,1 0115 Pac. 731 (1911).
In re Mosenan's Est., 38 La. Ann. 219 (1886) In re Buddig, 108 La.
406, 32 So. 361 (1902)
Successton of Verneuille, 120 La. 605, 45 So. 520
(1908)
Succession of LeBlanc, 142 La. 27, 76 So. 223(1917)
uln re Webb, Myrick's Probate p. 93 (1875).
" McKay on Community Property (2d ed) Sec. 535.
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ciple. The case itself is as old and very brief one, decided by an
inferior court. There is no authority cited in it and no reasoning
to support the conclusion. A subsequent California case cites it, 13
but no later case has been found which actually follows it, and in
In Re. Castagnola'sEstate' the California Supreme Court in language expressly approved the principle of the Louisiana decisions.
The question has not been determined m Washington in any insurance case, although it was presented to the Supreme Court in
the case of MutuaZ Benefit Life Ins. Co. v. Lundqusst.'5 The decision of the question was rendered unnecessary there by the conclusion of the court on the facts that the premiums paid upon the
policies in question were from the separate estate of the insured
husband.
In our previous discussion, we have been assuming a policy of
life insurance upon one of the spouses, payable to the estate of the
insured. If the policy, however, is payable to the surviving wife,
or to a mother or sister, a different set of problems is presented.
In the case of the policy payable to the wife, if there be
no provision m the policy for a change of beneficary, the interest
of the wife is vested and cannot be taken away from her by the
insured without her consent.' 6 If, however, as is usually the case
in the modern policy, the right to change the benefieiary is reserved
to the insured, then the interest of the wife is not vested.17 If she
takes, however, it is generally held, that the proceeds are her separate property and do not fall into the community estate.18 In some
States, ifieluding Washington, that result is fixed by statute,'
while in others it has been reached by the courts on the theory of
a gift by the husband to the wife.20 Since one spouse may convey
ns or her community interest in any property to the other, there
is no impediment to such a gift, except in the case of existing credNew York Life Ins. Co. v. Bank of Italy, 60 Cal. App. 602, 214 Pac. 61
(1923), In re Stara (1872). Myrick Probate p. 5, does not support the

principle of In re Webb.

1168 Cal. App. 732, 230 Pac. 188 (1924)
Is140 Wash. 345, 248 Pac. 808 (1926).
30In
re Heilbron's Est., 14 Wash. 536, 45 Pac. 153 (1896) Thomas
v. Grand Lodge, 12 Wash. 500, 503, 41 Pac. 882 (1895). The interest of
the beneficiary in a certificate in a mutual benefit society is not vested.
See also Cade v. Head Camp, 27 Wash. 218, 67 Pac. 603 (1902).
", Schade v. Western Union Life Ins. Co., 125 Wash. 200, 215 Pac. 521
(1923) Buckner v., Ridgely Protective Ass., 131 Wash. 174, 229 Pac. 313
(1924).

"8Johnson v. Cole (Tex.) 258 S. W 850 (1924).
"Rem. Comp. Stat. (1927 Sup.) Sec. 569-2.
0In re Dobbel's Estate, 104 Cal. 432, 38 Pac. 87 (1894).
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itors, and the statute generally endeavors to take care of their
interests.
In connection with this form of policy, very interesting and
important questions have arisen in bankruptcy as to the right of the
trustee to receive the cash surrender value of policies on the life
of the husband, payable to the wife, but with a right reserved to
change the beneficiary As the interest of the wife has not vested,
a trustee of her separate estate obviously could not reach the cash
surrender value. If the policy were taken out with community
funds, the trustee of the husband's separate estate obviously could
not reach the cash surrender value. The question remains whether
or not the trustee of the community estate can reach it. It is an
asset which the husband and wife can realize upon and it is difficult
to see why it should not be community property and, except for
the provisions as to exemption, pass to the trustee. Under the
exemption provision, however, it may be saved by virtue of the
State statutes. It was so held in Holden v. Stratton21 with refer
ence to the Washington Statute then in effect, but since repealed.
A careful sudent of this problem has expressed the opimon that
the last exemption statute of 19272 makes the law again doubtful. 2
A similar question arises in case of divorce. Does the cash surrender value constitute community property 9 Or shall the policy
be treated as community property? In Washington, where the interest of the wife is similar in quality to that of the husband, the
policy is clearly community property It should be treated as
having a value equal to its cash surrender value, at least. It is
easily conceivable, however, that its real value may greatly exceed
its cash surrender value, dependent upon the health of the insured.
The policy might well be awarded wholly to one spouse, 24 who might
thereafter pay the premiums and maintain the policy until the
end, or take advantage of an option which policies frequently contain by which the cash surrender value is applied to the purchase
of continued insurance for a specified term. In other words,
-198
"

U. S. 202, 49 L. ed. 1018, 25 Sup. Ct. R. 656 (1905).

See note 19, supra.

"THE EFFECT OF INSURED'S BANKRUPTCY ON POLICIES PAYABLE TO HIS
WIFE BUT RESERVING THE RIGHT TO CHANGE"-Paper read before the Asso-

ciation of Life Insurance Counsel December 10th, 1929, at New York City
by Francis B. Patten, Associate Counsel of the John Hancock Mutual Life
Insurance Co. of Boston.
"In Bundy v. Bundy, 149 Wash. 464, 271 Pac. 268 (1928) the policy
which was separate property of the husband, was awarded to him, although
the wife was beneficiary therein.
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if the community has chosen to speculate on the life of one of its
members, the benefit of that speculation is a community asset.
But, suppose a divorce is granted and the decree fails to declare
the rights of the spouses in the community property In Washmgton, in the case of other property the result is that the former
spouses become tenants in common of the property formerly community Is there any reason why the same conclusion should not
apply to the insurance contract915 In Texas "a wife's interest in
a policy on her husband's life ceases upon obtaining a decree of
divorce ' 26 , and "a judgment of divorce adjudging that all personal
property of whatsoever kind and character mentioned in the pleadings belong to the community estate, even if construed as including a policy on the husband's life in favor of the wife, does not
give her any interest in the policy after the divorce judgment goes

into effect.'

'2?

The problem of the policy payable to mother and sister is equally
important and more novel. The existence of such problem has
been unobserved by many members of the bar. This question was
also presented in the case of Mutual Benefit Life Ins. Co. v. Lundquest, supra,but was not determined in any of its difficult features.
There the policies were taken out before marriage upon the life of
the husband payable to the mother and sister. There can be no
question that a bachelor may give his separate property to any one
he pleases. If he chooses to take out a life insurance policy, payable to his mother, he may do so. After a man's marriage, however, his freedom to make gifts is very much limited by the community property system, at least as it exists in Washington. 28 In
Texas it has been said that the husband is free to give away the
community property as he sees fit, even to the impoverishment of
the wife. 29 Even in California the interest of the wife in community personalty, prior to the death of the husband, is an expectancy merely 20 In Washington, however, the interest of the
wife is of the same quality as that of the husband. 31 She is a half
owner in the property The husband is the manager of the com"*In Mende v. Mende, 148 Wash. 432, 269 Pac. 949 (1928), this interesting question was presented. It is submitted that the Company was right
in refusing to pay over to the husband the cash surrender value without
a legal proceeding to divest the interest or possible interest of the wife.
" Hatch v. Hatch, 35 Tex. Civ. App. 373, 80 S. W 411 (1904).
"N. W Mutual Life v. Whiteselle (Tex.) 188 S. W 22 (1916).
"But see Cade v. Head Camp, 27 Wash. 218, 61 Pac. 603 (1902).
'Jones v. Jones (Tex.) 146 S. W 265 (1912).
'Blethen v. Pacific Mutual Life Insurance Co., 198 Cal. 91, 243 Pac.
431 (1926).
"Olive v. Meek, 103 Wash. 467, 175 Pac. 33 (1918).
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munity, which is a sort of marital partnership and has been frequently by the Supreme Court, though probably incorrectly,
referred to as a separate entity 32 At any rate, the Supreme
Court has said that a husband as a manager of the community must use the community funds for the benefit of the
community He cannot give those funds away in fraud of the
wife. 8 This latter statement has been made in Texas, but the
exact meaning of the phrase has not yet been worked out there
and it may be that the Texas courts will yet come to the view which
the Supreme Court of the State of Washington apparently holds,
that any substantial gift of community funds to one outside of
the community is presumptively a fraud upon the wife. In California (where the matter is affected by the statute) it has been held
that a gift of community personalty by the husband is only voidable
and not void, that the wife upon discovery of the gift may disaffirm
it and recover her half interest.35 If one is to judge from the
present state of the Washington law, one would have to conclude
that the husband cannot make a valid gift of community property
in any substantial amount to one outside of the community, without
the assent of the wife.36 The application of that principle to life
insurance policies at once restricts the right of the husband to
designate any beneficiary, other than the wife, or to change the beneficiary to any other than the wife. It by no means follows, however, that such a thing can never be done. A community certainly
owes obligations to the children of the spouses. 37 If a policy of
insurance is taken out by the husband and father, upon his own
life, for the benefit of an invalid or incompetent daughter, the
policy can be easily supported as quite consistent with the principles laid down. It is not a gift, in any sense, in fraud of the wife.
It is a case where the manager of the community personalty is using
that personalty to meet the obligations of the community, and
31Artheller v. Spokane & Inland Emptre Ry Co., 107 Wash. 678, 182 Pac.
630 (1919)
Mattinson v.
11Stewart v. Bank of
Marston v. Rue, 92 Wash.
Wash. 24, 207 Pac. 1062
Pac. 634 (1917).

Mattinson, 128 Wash. 328, 222 Pac. 620 (1924).
Endicott, 82 Wash. 106, 143 Pac. 458 (1914)
129, 159 Pac. 111 (1916) Parker v. Parker 121
(1922)
Schramm v. Steele, 97 Wash. 309, 166

1,Blethen v. Pacsfic Mutual Life Insurance Co., see note 30, supra.

3'Adams v. Black, 6 Wash. 528, 33 Pac. 1074 (1893) Litzell v. Hart,
96 Wash. 471, 165 Pac. 393 (1917) McAlptne v. Kohler & Chase, 96 Wash.
146, 164 Pac. 755 (1917)
11But see remarks of Tolman J. in Stevens v. Naches State Bank, 136
Wash. at 144, 238 Pac. 918 (1925)
3'Rorwlett v. Mitchell, 52 Tex. Civ. Appj. 589 (1908)
Jones v. Jones
(Tex) 146 S. W 256, Stevens v. Naches Bank, 136 Wash. 137, 238 Pac.
918 (1925).
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such a policy would be held valid even though the wife should
dissent from the act of the husband. As he has been appointed by
law the statutory manager of the community personalty, in case of
difference of opinion as to the proper method of meeting community obligations, his judgment can properly be allowed to control.
So a policy taken out after the second marriage, but for the benefit
of the children of the husband by a former marriage, has been sustained in Texas as not in violation of the rights of the second wife.38
Likewise a policy for the benefit of the aged father of the husband,
where the community property was substantial and the community
contribution to the premiums on the policy very small, has been
sustained.3 9 Nor does the principle we have discussed prevent the
taking out of a policy by a husband upon his own life for the
benefit of a relative who may have advanced money to the community, or who may have performed for the husband obligations owed
to the husband, but unperformed by the wife. This is the principle
of the case of Unonn Mutual Life Insurance Co. v. Brodemck.40 As
the manager of the community the husband may certainly borrow
money, and in connection with the making of a loan, he may give
security, and if he originally makes the loan without security,
there is the moral obligation to repay, and he may subsequently
give security for that loan by way of insurance upon his own life.
If, however, the husband takes out a policy of life insurance after
marriage, paying the first and subsequent premiums with community funds, and designates as beneficiary in the policy one outside the community, and to which the community has no financial
or moral obligation, and the wife has in no wise assented to the gift,
it seems probable that in Washington the proceeds of that policy
can be claimed to be community property and the wife would be
entitled to her interest in it.41 Under such circumstances it is important for the insurance companies to know whether they are protected if they pay over the proceeds to the beneficiary other than
the wife. In California it has been held that they are protected
even though they have notice of the wife's existence and possible
interest if payment is made prior to notice from the wife that she
has elected to avoid the gift.42 In Washington the company was
23Rowlett v. Mitchell, 52 Tex. Civ. App. 589, 114 S. W 846 (1908).

"Jones v. Jones, (Tex.) 146 S. W 265 (1912).
196 Cal. 497, 238 Pac. 1034 (1925).
Cade v. Head Camp, supra, would seem to be contrary, unless it can
be distinguished because concerned with a certificate in a mutual benefit
society. The distinction, though often made, is not sound. The case, also,
is an early case, decided long before the interest of the wife came to be
regarded with such favor as today.
"4Blethen v. Pacific Mutual Life Ins. Co., see note 30, supra.
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freed from liabilities where the husband had been given possession of the policy by the wife and he had changed the beneficiary to
his estate and assigned his policies to a bank to secure loans previously made to the community 43 The courts will undoubtedly
give weight to the practical necessities of the situation. The contract is a chose in action generally calling for the payment of
money to a certain individual. Certainly if the company had no
knowledge, as it generally would not, that any change constituted
a gift in fraud of the wife, it would have no right to refuse the demand of the beneficiary for payment. There is no obligation upon
it to go out and investigate as to the possible rights of the wife. It
is her duty to be vigilant in asserting her own rights. Otherwise,
the insurance company is justified in paying, and the wife is relegated to her right to proceed against the beneficiary who has col44
lected.
No attempt is here made to determine the proper result under
all of the infinite variety of facts and circumstances which may exist
in connection with the complicated modern insurance policy, added
to the complexities of the commuinty property system. It is hoped,
however, that the foregoing discussion of principles may be of
assistance in reaching the correct solution when once the exact
facts have been ascertained.
F.ED W CATLETT.

11Schade v. Western Union Life Ins. Co., 125 Wash. 200, 215 Pac. 521
(1923).
"Holmes v. Gilnan, 138 N. Y. 369" 20 L. R. A. 566 (1893) Shaler v.
Trow bridge, 28 N. J. Eq. 545 (1877)
*Of the Seattle Bar.

